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Segregated Communities: Segregated Finance 
 
An Analysis of Race, Income and Small 
Consumer Loans in Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN, 









Segregated Communities: Segregated Finance1 
 
 
The racial composition of neighborhoods is related to access to good, affordable credit. In low 
income communities of color, high cost loans— both in the home mortgage market and small 
consumer loan market—are much more common than they are in white and middle-class 
communities. Poor people of color pay more for loans—an extra cost that many families can ill-
afford. 
 
Previous work by the Institute on Race and Poverty documented a dual credit market in the Twin 
Cities mortgage markets—where even high-income people living in neighborhoods of color were 
overwhelmingly likely to apply for and receive subprime loans and even low income people 
living in white segregated communities were overwhelmingly likely to apply for and receive 
prime loans.  
 
This research looks at the geographic and legal landscape of consumer credit:  Access to small 
loans, commonly known as payday loans, in the three largest metropolitan regions in the North 
West Area Foundation’s service area: Minneapolis-St. Paul, Seattle, and Portland.  
 
Geography and Payday Lending: Race Affects the Concentration of High Cost Lenders 
 
The Minneapolis-St. Paul, Seattle and Portland metropolitan areas have different geographies of 
income and race- leading to differential access to both credit and payday lending across the 
metropolitan regions: 
 
• In all three metros it is clear that racially segregated communities of color fared the worst in 
terms of accessing banks and having more lenders that charge very high interest rates for 
small loan products, such as payday lenders, check cashers and pawnshops. This is especially 
evident in Minneapolis-St. Paul where non-white segregated census tracts are more numerous 
and concentrated in the lower-income core of the region.  
 
• Communities of color have better access to banks in less segregated metropolitan regions. 
There are fewer segregated neighborhoods in Portland and Seattle, and there are an 
abundance of banks in racially integrated areas in these regions. 
 
• Lower income neighborhoods also had disproportionate shares of non-conventional lenders 
and residential neighborhoods of the central cities had comparably fewer banks than 






                                                 
1 We thank Northwest Area Foundation for funding this report and thank the University of Minnesota Law School 
Consumer Law Clinic, especially Professors Prentiss Cox and Steve Meili, Ron Elwood of Mid-Minnesota Legal 
Assistance, and Jeanne Fox of the Consumer Federation of America, for advice and excellent information. 
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Law and Payday Lending: Effective Regulation 
 
The legal restraints on payday lending affect the concentration of payday lenders in all 
metropolitan regions. The restriction that appears to most effectively limit the proliferation of 
payday lenders is interest rate and fee caps. 
 
• Washington allows the highest cost payday loans- and, unsurprisingly has the greatest 
number of payday lenders. Although Washington has aggressive laws that attempt to limit 
loan rollovers—where borrowers end up taking out payday loans to repay payday loans—
these industry-supported provisions seem to do little to limit the proliferation of payday 
lending.  
 
• Minnesota has historically required lower-cost payday loans, and, correspondingly, has fewer 
payday lenders. The discovery of a loophole in payday lending regulation—the state’s 
industrial thrift act—has increased the maximum cost of payday loans in Minnesota and 
encouraged the expansion of payday lenders in the region. 
  
• Oregon has the most stringent requirements for payday lenders of the group—limiting both 




While the bans on roll-over and “cooling off” periods between payday loans tend to be easier to 
pass in state legislatures—these bills tend to be supported by the payday loan industry—rate caps 
are the most effective means of reducing the cost of payday lending. Likewise, increasing the 
amount of consumer disclosures, or increasing efforts to educate consumers about the cost of 
these loans, has not been shown to effectively reduce the harms of high-cost lending. 
 
Ineffective Regulation: 
• Cooling-off Periods: Borrowers and lenders easily circumvent cooling off periods 
between loans, rendering even fairly sophisticated attempts to stop loan roll-overs 
ineffective.  
    
• Consumer Disclosures: There is little evidence that consumer disclosures or consumer 
education effectively changes consumer behavior. 
 
Effective Regulation: 
• Rate Caps: After a Department of Defense Study found that payday lending was harming 
military readiness, Congress passed, and George W. Bush signed a law that prohibits 
lenders from charging more than 36 percent APR to active-duty military families. 
Research by consumer advocacy groups, such as the Center for Responsible Lending 
have also found that a 36 percent rate cap on payday loans was the most effective way to 
prevent consumers from becoming trapped in an ever-growing debt cycle. 
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• Create Alternative to Payday Loans: Encouraging traditional lenders, banks, and credit 
unions to offer affordable short term credit to low income consumers will provide a safe 
alternative to high-cost payday loans.   
 
Fix the Safety Net: 
• High—or moderate—cost loans cannot resolve the problem of increasing economic 
security for lower and even middle income Americans.2 Payday and other predatory 
lending and the attendant consequences for families and communities will remain until 
real fixes to the social safety-net are implemented. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
With economic times the way they are now it is becoming harder for everyone to makes ends 
meet; some are going to a payday loan to get them by till next payday. There is another way but 
one must be very careful to recognize if it is a possibility. You can ask for a raise. When I say 
you must be careful, I mean you should tread lightly and realize if you really deserve a raise or if 
you just think you deserve a raise, and if your company can even afford to give you a raise right 
now. ... And remember if you do get a “No,” or even if you get a “Yes,” but are not able to make 
bills on time, a payday loan may be what you need to get through.3 
 
Payday loans are short-term, high cost loans that, depending on your perspective, are trapping 
America’s working poor in an ever-deepening cycle of debt or providing needed short-term 
credit. The reality is probably both assertions are true; although, the very fact that America’s 
working poor have to acquire high-cost credit to survive may indicate deeper problems with our 
economic safety-net. Research by reputable scholars, as well as consumer groups has found that 
most payday consumers take out not one, but many payday loans. This type of borrowing is very 
expensive for families, destabilizing their already fragile economic position and increasing their 
likelihood of becoming bankrupt- among other negative outcomes. Nonetheless, families do have 
economic shortfalls, sudden expenses, such a medical bills or car repairs are often greater than 
families’ immediate resources and short-term loans allow families to get necessary medical 
treatment, keep utilities on and cars running.  
 
A predominate reason borrowers use payday loans is to deal with unexpected expenses.4 Payday 
loans are not the only method that families have to get over these income shortfalls. Families 
facing unexpected expenses use their own savings, credit cards, borrow from friends or relatives, 
renegotiate bills or payment with utilities and creditors, and take out short term loans from banks 
and credit unions. Most people do not take out payday loans. In fact in 2007 only 2.9 percent of 
the population used payday loans.5 Most payday borrowers are unmarried women and have a 
                                                 
2Historically, states have developed usury laws during times when the income inequality is high. Glaeser (1994). 
3 Quote from: http://personalmoneystore.com/moneyblog/2009/01/26/pay-raise-or-payday-loan-you-decide/ last 
accessed 05/29/2009. 
4 Half of payday borrowers use the money to cover emergencies or basic consumptive needs- including food and 
shelter. Logan and Weller (2009) at 11. 
5 Logan and Weller (2009) at 4 Data from the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances. 
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high school, but no college degree.6 The mean family income of payday borrowers was $32,614 
in 2007.7 In other words, the average payday borrower is a member of the working poor- their 
income is too much to be eligible for public benefits and they make too little to cushion their 
families from the sort of financial shocks, like medical expenses, that are common in our 
economy. 
 
Because of consumers’ need for short-term credit and a lessening of restrictions on payday 
lending in many states, payday lending has exploded. In the 1990s, payday lending was a 
somewhat rare phenomenon. Today, there are now more payday lenders in the United States than 
McDonald's, Burger King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target stores combined. 8 The growth in 
payday lending is mirrored by a growing discontent about the economic effects of these high cost 
loans on consumers. In particular, payday lending is suspected of having its greatest impact in 
segregated neighborhoods of color- where individuals have historically had a hard time accessing 
traditional credit and where people are most vulnerable to economic upheaval. State payday 
lending regulations and the geography of metropolitan regions can lead to a greater or lesser 
concentration of payday lenders in a metropolitan region. Past research has indicated a 
correlation between race and the use of payday lenders.9  
 
This research looks at the geographic and legal landscape of payday lending in the three largest 
metropolitan regions in the North West Area Foundation’s service area: Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Seattle, and Portland. While none of the states encompassing these metropolitan regions allows 
unfettered payday lending, none completely bans it either. Likewise, the three metros differ by 
income and race- leading to differential access to both credit and payday lending across the 
metropolitan regions.  
 
 
II.  Small, High Priced Consumer Loans: Payday Loans and Check Cashing 
 
A.  Payday Borrowers 
 
The vast majority of low income Americans have bank accounts. About 75 percent of families 
earning less than $18,900 and about 87 percent of families earning between $18,000 and $33,900 
per year have bank accounts.10 These banked households, however, face a banking and credit 
system that is poorly equipped to help them manage their family finances. The financial services 
that low income households with bank accounts receive are expensive—families often pay very 
high overdraft and minimum balance fees because low income families have constrained family 
incomes and a limited supply of credit.11 Even low income families with bank accounts often 
turn to high-cost alternative financial services providers, such as pawnshops, payday lenders, 
                                                 
6 Logan and Weller (2009) (4) Data from the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances. 
7 Iid at 7. The median income was $30,892. The Mean and median family incomes for non-payday borrowers were $ 
85,473 and $ 48,397 respectively.  
8 Karger, 2005.  
9 Stegman and Faris, 2001, 2005, also King, Li, Davis, and Ernst (2005); Mahon (2005). 
10 Bucks (2006) 
11 See Barr (2008) at 6.  
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rent-to-own stores, and tax refund lenders to fulfill their day-to-day banking needs, such as 
cashing checks and paying bills.  
 
Alternative financial services providers provide banking services to banked and unbanked people 
who are poorly served by the traditional banking structure. These families are, by definition, low 
income, have few assets and many have poor or no credit, meaning that they have little money to 
invest in banks and lenders see them as high risk. When these families experience financial 
shortfalls, because of unexpected bills (usually car repairs or medical expenses) or unexpected 
income short falls (job loss or hour reduction), they are often unable to meet all of their financial 
obligations. For these families, the tradeoffs become untenable: Pay for the car repair (otherwise, 
I cannot get to work), pay for the electric bill (or my power will be shut off), or pay my rent (or I 
will be evicted). For the working poor who are facing impossible financial decisions, payday 
lending seems like a rescue plan.  
 
In truth, however, most payday borrowers have several options other than payday loans, 
including negotiations with utility companies, loans from friends or family, or even pay advances 
from their employers. Payday lending is often, however, the most convenient, albeit the most 
expensive, method of overcoming financial shortfalls. The problem is that these loans usually 
often become middle-to-long term debt, with disabling costs. The average borrower pays back 
about $793 for a $325 loan.12  
 
B. The cost of payday lending 
 
Payday loans are, by definition, small consumer loans; state law usually sets the maximum loan 
amount. Loans generally range from $300 to $500. In exchange for the loan the borrower turns 
over a postdated check for the amount of the loan and fee. The fee for a typical $325 payday loan 
is set by state law, but averages about $52.13 Because most borrowers turn over their loans, the 
average payday borrower enters a cycle of at least five loans prior to default or payoff. As a 
result, that fee gets paid many times while renewing the same loan.14  
 
Loan turnover occurs because borrowers cannot afford to pay back the loan in its entirety when it 
becomes due. Payday customers are often unable to repay loans when they come due. This is not 
surprising given the very short term of the loan and the financial profile of the borrowers. In 
some states, borrowers can pay another finance fee and renew the loan. In states that ostensibly 
prohibit turnover, borrowers repay the entirety of the loan; the payday lender then reissues the 
loan and returns the money with subtraction of additional finance charges.15  
 
For example, when a customer takes out of $325 payday loan, she writes a $325 postdated check 
to the lender and receives $273 (the amount minus the finance charges). She then comes back in 
two weeks, when the loan is due, with another $325, and receives $221. In two weeks, she again 
brings in $325 and receives $169. When she attempts the seventh turnover, she can no longer get 
                                                 
12 King et al. (2006) 
13 Logan and Walker (2009) at 2.  
14 Center for Responsible Lending (2009);  
15 Occasionally there is a twenty-four hour or more waiting period. Research shows that even in states with waiting 
periods, payday loans are often renewed because borrowers simply cannot afford to pay them off.  
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any money back- the finance charge is larger than the loan principle, she has paid $312 and still 
owes $325. 
 
The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that of the 17 million payday borrowers, 12 
million became trapped in a cycle of repeat loans for at least five lending periods. The Center 
calculated that this amounts to $4.2 billions dollars in excess fees every year.16  
 
Payday borrowing is associated with delayed medical care,17 increased evictions,18 credit card 
delinquencies,19 involuntary bank account closures,20 and bankruptcy.21 For example, Paige 
Skiba of Vanderbilt law school and Jeremy Tobacman of the Wharton School found that 
receiving a payday loan for the first time increases a borrower’s risk of entering bankruptcy by 
2.48 percentage points.22 Likewise, Michael Barr of Michigan Law School found that payday 
borrowers, compared to similarly-situated non-payday borrowers, were three times more likely 
to enter bankruptcy, twice as likely to be evicted, and three times more likely to have their 
utilities shut off.23   
 
Research conducted using the records of a large Texas payday lender found that over half of 
payday borrowers default- although most paid fees equaling 90 percent of their loan principle 
plus the principle itself.24 Payday lenders argue that high default rates justify the high costs of 
these loans. In fact, payday lending may be no more profitable than any other business – even 
with high fees and large profits margins on a product with little overhead.25 However, the 
argument that extremely high interest rates are needed assumes that default rates would not be 
substantially lower if interest costs were lower. If it is the high rates and fees themselves that 
cause the high default rates (by generating exorbitant costs above and beyond the principle and 
normal interest), then the same set of loans might be supportable at a lower interest rate with 
lower default rates. Experimental programs like North Carolina State Employee Credit Union’s 
Salary Advance Loan program (described below) could be used to test this proposition.   
 
C.  The regulation of payday lending 
 
As recently as the 1980s, payday lending was effectively banned in most states. The ban on 
payday loans arose in the first part of the twentieth century in an effort to control loan sharking. 
Loan sharking was the practice of issuing short-term, high cost loans, with triple digit interest 
rates. These loans often became long-term, debt. While loan sharks usually did not resort to 
violence to secure repayment of these loans, they did turn to the courts to force repayment. These 
                                                 
16 King, 2006.  
17 Melzer (2008).  
18 Barr 2008) 
19 Aragwal et al. (2009) 
20 Campbell at al .(2008). 
21 Skiba and Tobacman (2008). 
22 Skiba and Tobacman (2008). 
23 Barr (2008). 
24 Skiba and Tobacman (2008). 
25 De Young and Phillis (2009). 
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lenders used a variety of fictions to make the loans, and often characterized them as “salary 
assignments.”26  
 
The practice of salary assignment and loan sharking was largely eliminated by the Russell Sage 
Foundation’s Small Loan law, which was adopted by most states. Under the law, states licensed 
small consumer lenders and allowed both small lenders and mainstream lenders to make short 
term loans with interest rates ranging from 24 to 42 percent per year. These regulations stayed in 
place through the 1970s. After the Supreme Court’s decision in National First Bank v. Omaha 
Service Corporation, however, federal and state chartered banks were effectively no longer 
constrained by usury laws.   
 
State usury laws still constrained small consumer lenders. These lenders began to lobby state 
legislators to legalize very high interest rates on payday loans. Payday loans are, effectively, 
salary assignments, the borrower promises to turn over future earnings for a present loan. Salary 
assignment, however, is illegal under federal law.27 State legislators, instead legalized a form of 
salary assignment where borrowers give lenders a post-dated check, rather than a promise of 
future earnings to secure the loan. Further, instead of legalizing triple-digit interest rates, states 
legalized fees on loans that amounted to triple-digit interest rates.28 
 
Payday lenders argue that high maximum APRs on payday loans should not worry states because 
the high loan rates will be driven down by market competition. Research, however, has shown 
that this is not the case. Payday loan fees (or interest rates) usually end-up with loan prices near 




Minnesota has allowed payday lending since 1995, albeit with somewhat more restrictive interest 
requirements than many other states.30 Minnesota’s payday lending law has a complex tiered 
system of fees.31 The maximum allowed fee under the small loans statute depends on the amount 
of the loan, and is a percentage of the loan plus an add–on fee. Overall, for a loan of $325, the 
law allows a finance charge of $24.50, which translates in to a 197 percent annual percentage 
rate (APR) on a loan with a term of two weeks.32  
 
                                                 
26 National Consumer Law Center (1995) 
27 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(3). 
28 Peterson (2008). 
29 Further, in places with high concentrations of payday lenders in Colorado, loan fees (and APRs) were highest. In 
places with fewer payday lenders, loan prices were somewhat lower- indicating that payday lenders compete with 
other sources of credit and not necessarily with each other. DeYoung and Phillips (2009) 
30 1995 Minnesota Session Laws, Chapter 202, Article 3, Section 2. 
31 Loans up to and including $50, can be assessed up to $5.50 in fees, amounts to an APR of 287% on a loan of $50. 
Loans between $50 and $100 can incur a fee of ten percent of the loan plus a $5 fee, this allows of $15 fee on $100 
which is a 390 percent APR on a two week loan. Loans between $ 100 and $250 can be assessed a seven percent 
plus $5 fee, amounting to $22.50 on a $250 loan and 192 % APR. For loan between $250 and $350, a six percent 
plus $5 fee can be assess, this is a $26 fee on an amount of $350 and an APR of 193 %. 
32 We use Annual Percentage Rates (APR) to calculate the total cost of loans because it is a standard measure that 
allows us to compare the relative cost of one loan to another. 
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Minnesota’s law originally required a 30 day loan.33  This meant that initially, payday loan costs 
in Minnesota were quite a bit lower. For example, a finance charge of $24.50 on a $325 loan on a 
month-to-month term would be an 82 percent APR. The year after payday lending was legalized 
in Minnesota, the law was changed to require a 30 day maximum loan period.34 In comparison to 
the rest of the country, these payday loan APRs are relatively low and may account for the 
slower growth of payday lending in the Twin Cities region. Payday lending, however, is now 
growing rapidly. This is a result of larger market players entering the Minnesota market and 
lenders’ use of a different statute, to conduct higher-fee payday lending.  
 
As payday lenders reach total market saturation in some states or are legally barred from 
operating in other states, national payday lenders have taken a greater interest in entering the 
Minnesota market. Advance America, the South Carolina-based lending mammoth has been 
steadily lobbying for higher fees and interest rates in order to facilitate its spread into the 
Minnesota market.35 One national Chain (Ace Cash Express) is now present in Minnesota. 
Technically, however, Ace Cash Express is an Industrial Thrift and it makes industrial consumer 
loans rather than payday loans. This means that these stores can charge more for loans (and thus 
make greater profits) and make loans for more than $350.  
 
Industrial consumer loans and payday loans (small consumer loans) are very nearly the same 
thing- both carry extremely high APRs and are usually issued for a term of around two weeks. 
The difference is in the total amount that the lender can lend and the total fees the lender can 
charge. Several years ago, payday lenders in Minnesota began reorganizing as state-chartered 
“industrial thrifts,” a loophole in state regulation that allowed them to charge more for payday 
loans. This increased both the cost of payday loans to borrowers and the profits of lenders.   
 
Industrial thrifts are allowed to assess a finance charge of 21.75 percent APR or, 33 percent APR 
on amounts less than $750, and 19 percent APR on the balance over $750. Added on to this 
finance charge, which is calculated as APR, are other fees that Minnesota law defines are not 
part of the finance charge. These fees include an annual charge of $50 per loan,36 a $30 charge 
for obtaining a cash advance,37 and a $25 administrative fee.38  
 
Different industrial thrifts seem to interpret these add-on fees differently. For example, Payday 
America, a Minnesota Industrial Thrift appears to charge about 33.5 percent interest on amounts 
up to $900, plus a $25-$30 “advance charge,” plus an annual fee between $2 and $50.39 This 
amounts to APRs, as stated by the company, between 262 and 737 percent.  (In this case, the 
company seems to be using interest, plus the open ended credit fees). The Unloan company on 
the other hand, also a Minnesota industrial thrift, charges 33 percent APR on loans up to $500, 
plus a $25 dollar administrative fee.40 While Unloan does not calculate the APR,41 it amounts to 
                                                 
33 1995 Minnesota Session Laws Chapter 202, Article 3, Section 2.  
34 1996 Minnesota Session Laws, Chapter 414, Article 2, Section 7.  
35 H.J. Cummins, “Legislators Seek to Curtail “Payday Lending” Practices,” Star Tribune Feb. 23, 2008. 
36 Minnesota Statues Section 47.59 subdivision 6 (c) (1)). 
37 Minnesota Statutes, Section 47.59 subdivision 6 (c)(4)). 
38 Minnesota Statutes, Section 47.59, subdivision 6 (d). 
39 www.payday America.net last accessed 05/21/2009 
40 www.unloan.com/howitworks2.asp last accessed 05/21/2009. 
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about $33.94 on a $325 two-week loan, which is about a 272 percent APR. In this case, it 
appears that the thrift views payday loans as “close-ended credit.” 
 
Regardless of the type of payday loan, small consumer or industrial consumer, payday loan 
companies in Minnesota will generally not “rollover” loans- meaning that the payday customer 
has to bring in the amount of money owed on the date that is it due. The lender will then issue a 
new loan for the same amount of money. Minnesota does not allow rollovers, although the small 
consumer loan law does allow the company to charge a 5 percent interest rate on a past due 
loan.42 Likewise, an industrial consumer loan could be extended at the appropriate APR. The 
reason why lenders generally do not offer this option to customers is that it is less profitable. In 





Payday lending in Oregon was licensed by the state in 2001, and became a $250 million dollar 
industry by 2004. In 2004, the Oregon Division of Finance and Corporate Security conducted a 
survey of payday borrowers and an examination of payday lenders. This examination found that 
Oregonians were using payday loans to purchase food and pay basic bills, that the average 
borrower took out nine loans per year from single lenders, and that payday borrowers were 
paying over 500 percent APR on an average $380 loan.43 Consumer advocacy groups, such as 
OSPIRG (Oregon State Public Research Group) did further consumer studies and publicized the 
high payday APRs and the fact that Oregonians were using these loans to pay for basic 
necessities, such as food. In response, numerous cities, including Portland, Gresham, Silverton 
and Eugene, passed ordinances in 2005 and 2006 which limited the ability of payday lenders to 
operate within city limits.  
In 2006, Oregon passed comprehensive payday lending reform.44 Oregon law now caps all 
consumer loans, including payday and title loans. For loans with a term of 31 to 60 days, the 
interest rate is capped at 36 percent per year plus a one time fee of $30 or $10 for every $100 of 
the loan, whichever is less.45  Interest rates on consumer loans over 60 days are capped at 30 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 The Industrial Thrift Act specifically exempts these additional finance fees from calculation into APR. (Minnesota 
Statutes Section 47.59 subdivision 3 (d)(2). The law does require industrial thrifts to warn customers that they have 
been assessed additional fees, outside of the APR. Minnesota Statutes, Section 47.59. Subdivision. 12..  
42 Minnesota Statues, Section 47.57, subdivision 6 (4). 
43 Oregon Division of Finance and Corporate Securities, “Payday Loans in Oregon.” Available at 
http://dfcs.oregon.gov/cf/fact_sheet.html (2006).  
44 The law took effect in 2007. 
45 Oregon Revised Statutes, section 725.615. After the Oregon Legislature passed this legislation, 91 of the state’s 
354 payday lenders applied for a “conventional” license, in an attempt to circumvent the payday lending restrictions. 
Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services, press release, “Oregon takes additional steps to protect 
consumers from high-cost loans” Sept. 21, 2006.  To prevent lenders from evading the new interest rate caps, 
OSPIRG worked together with groups such as Our Oregon, AARP, SEIU Local 503, Lutheran Advocacy Ministry, 
Ecumenical Ministries, and Oregon Law Center to advocate a package of bills to extend the interest rate caps to all 
consumer finance lending. (cite) Oregon both adopted rate caps for all small consumer loans and defined payday 
lenders as lenders who make ten percent or more of their loans are for durations of less than 60 days. Oregon 
Revised Statute section 725.600. 
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percentage points above the Federal Reserve's discount rate.46 This means a borrower pays a 
maximum of $39.94 for a $325 payday loan. If the term of the loan is the 31 day statutory 
minimum, the APR on this loan is 147 percent.47  
The new law allows a lender to renew an existing payday loan up to two times after the first loan 
is made.48 Lenders are allowed to charge interest on the renewal, but they may not charge any 
additional origination fees. Lenders may not make new payday loans (other than renewals) the 
day the loan expires or during the six days before and the six days after the date on which a 
payday loan expires. This prohibition on the issuance of new loans should effectively prevent 
side-door loan turnovers—where consumers (and lenders) avoid restrictions on turnovers by 
requiring borrowers to “repay” the loan and then immediately reissuing the loan. Without this 
prohibition, side-door turnovers could, because of new origination fees, lead to higher cost loans 
than intended by statute. The law does not require lenders to renew loans, but if a borrower did 
renew a $325 loan, she would pay $9.94 for the first renewal, and $9.94 for the second renewal, 
at which point she would be prohibited from taking renewing again.49 The total amount owed in 




In 2005, the major newspaper in the Seattle region, the Post-Intelligencer, released a series of 
news reports and analysis on payday lending in the Seattle-Tacoma area.51 The report found 
payday lenders clustered near neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty, high 
concentrations of Blacks, and near the Fort Lewis Military Reservation. Statistical analysis found 
that controlling for population, income, poverty rates, and education, there was a pattern of 
association between places where Blacks and military employees lived and payday lenders.52  
 
Nonetheless, efforts to reign-in Washington States’ burgeoning payday lending business have 
accomplished little and the number of loans made to Washington consumers has increased 
steadily. In 2007, payday lenders made nearly $1.5 billion dollars worth of loans.53 An analysis 
by the Washington Department of Financial Services (DFI) found that about 80 percent of 
Washington payday borrowers took out more than one payday loan and more than 50 percent of 
borrowers took out five or more payday loans from any one lender.54 The average payday loan 
                                                 
46 For loans with a term of greater than 60 day, the federal reserve interest rate was 0.44, so these loans were capped 
at 36 percent. 
47 The highest maximum APR is on a loan of 300, that APR would be 157 percent. (300(.36)) Interest for payday 
loans is computed on a 365-day factor or, in a leap year, a 366-day factor. Oregon Administrative Rules 441-730-
0160 and 441-730-0270.  
48 Oregon Revised Statutes, section 725.622. 
49 Oregon Administrative Rule 441-730-0270 prohibits compounding interest on payday loans.  
50 (((59.82/91)365)/325))= 0.72 
51 Phong Cat Le, “Payday Loans Offer Fast Help – at a Price” Seattle Post Intelligencer, May 24, 2005. 
52 Ibid 
53 Washinton State Department of Financial Institutions, 2007 Payday Lending Report p 3. 
54 Washington State Department of Financial Institutions, 2007 Payday Lending Report pp. 4-5. This data was based 
on information collected from Washington’s 20 licensees that has more than 10 million in loans and were required 
to provide data and 14 licensees who provided data voluntarily. These 34 companies  
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was $424.39, and 82 percent of loans were less than three weeks in duration. Forty-eight percent 
of loans were 14 days or less in duration.55   
 
Payday borrowing restrictions in Washington cover the gamut of possibilities. However, the state 
allows fairly high interest rates, about 390% APR on a $300-two week loan. Payday loans in 
Washington must be accompanied by a written note giving the customer a calculation of interest 
in terms of APR, as defined by the Truth in Lending Act. The maximum aggregate payday loan 
is $700 plus fees, the maximum loan term is forty-five days, and there is no minimum loan 
term.56 Payday loan fees are capped at 15 percent of the first $500 –$45 on a $300 dollar loan 
and $75 on a $500 loan.57 For amounts in excess of $500, the fee cap is 10 percent.58 This means 
that a maximum loan of $700 can carry up to a $95 fee. This amounts to 390 percent APR on a 
typical $424- two week payday loan.59  
 
Payday lenders are prohibited from rolling-over loans.60 Customers have the right to covert their 
loan into a   repayment plan after four successive loans, but prior to default.61 Payday lenders are 
obligated to provide customers notice of their right to repayment plan which, under the statute 
lasts for 60 days and provides for at least three payments, spaced at substantially equivalent 
intervals.62 The lender is allowed to charge the customer a one-time fee for the payment plan of 
the amount equivalent to the fee for taking out a payday loan of the same amount.63 This means 
that the fee to convert a payday loan into a payment plan can be up to $63 on a $424 loan, 
equivalent to a 90 percent APR.64 If the customer defaults on a payment plan, the lender is 
entitled to charge an additional $25 and to initiate collection action.65 Customers must also be 
notified of their right to rescission—the right to terminate the loan within a certain amount of 
time . Nonetheless, only 13 percent of Washington borrowers used repayment plans in 2007.  
 
In May of 2009, the Washington legislature passed new restrictions on payday lending. This bill 
ties the length of the loan term to the individual’s pay date, effectively setting a minimum loan 
period of seven days.66 The maximum loan is set at $700 or 30 percent of the borrower’s gross 
monthly income.67 Lenders are now prohibited from lending to borrowers who have taken out 
eight payday loans from any lender in a 12 month period, who are on a payment (installment) 
plan or who have defaulted on a payday loan in the last two years. Most significantly, the bill 
                                                 
55 DFI 2007 (from 88% percent of licensees). 
56 Revised Code of Washington , section 31.45.073 (2) 
57 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.43.073(3). The statute caps “interest or fees” and allows the director of 
The Washington Department of Financial Institutions to determine which fees are not subject to the interest/fee cap. 
58 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.45.073(3). 
59 (63.60(52/2))/300 = 390 
60 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.04 . In fact, lenders are prohibited from issuing loans to pay back loans 
even from other lenders, and Washington keeps a database of loans. 
61 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.45.084 
62 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.04 et seq. 
63 Revised Code of Washington , section 31.45.084 
64 (63.60 X (360/60))/300 = 0.90  
65 Revised Code of Washington, section 31.45.084. Lenders are, however, prohibited from charging any fee for the 
dishonored or “bounced” check. Ibid. 
66 If the next pay date is less than seven days away, the law requires the loan’s due date to be the borrower’s second 
pay date.  
67 Washington House Bill 1709 (2009) 
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changes the terms of repayment plans, eliminating the fees and extending the payment period to 
ninety days for loans up to $400, and 180 days for larger loans.68 Equally significantly, the new 
bill does not lower payday lending fees.69 
Cross-state Comparisons 
Washington allows the highest charges and interest rates for payday lenders of the three states. A 
fee on a $325 loan is $48.75 and the APR for a two week loan is 348 percent, twice that of 
Oregon. (Table 1) Oregon has the most stringent requirements for payday lenders of the group. 
Minnesota has lower fees that the other two states, but has larger APRs than Oregon. In 
Minnesota small lenders that are regulated as industry and thrifts actually charge a higher fee and 
have much higher APRs than regulated small lenders. Payday lenders also do not have minimum 
loan terms required by the State of Minnesota. 
Table 1: Fees and Interest Rates of Payday Lenders  
 




APR  2 week 
loan 
Minnesota $ 24.50  (small lender)          
$ 33.94  (thrift) 
        none          197 % 
          272 % 
Washington  $ 48.75       7 days           348 % 
 
Oregon $ 39.94      31 days           149 % 
 
 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington all require lenders to comply with federal Truth-in Lending 
disclosures. In all states, this includes informing the customer of the APR,  through posted signs, 
materials given to consumer at the time of the loan or both. Minnesota even requires lenders to 
tell borrowers that they could get the same loan for less elsewhere. Yet, the number of payday 
lenders—and payday borrowers—is steadily increasing.  
 
The impact that state law and regulation has on the how many payday lenders there are in a 
region and how they are distributed across neighborhoods becomes more complex in areas that 
are near state borders. For instance, the Portland, Oregon metropolitan region straddles the State 
of Washington and more lenient payday lender regulations in Washington has led to a 
proliferation in payday lenders in the Washington State portion of the Portland region. 
Lenient payday lending regulation can also lead to a proliferation in payday lending stores in 
areas that lack conventional lenders such as banks and credit unions. In such cases, payday 
lenders could be more apt to locate in places that lack conventional lenders, such as low-income 
neighborhoods and neighborhoods that are predominately people of color. 
                                                 
68 The bill also changes the term “payment plan” as well, converting it into “installment plan.” 
69 The original version of the bill set a minimum loan term of 60 days, lowered the fee to 10% of the amount loans. 
This amounts to $30 on a $300  loan and 60% APR- the reduction in APR is mostly due to the extended loan term. 
The original bill seems to be substantially altered by a substitute bill offered by the same authors as the original bill. 
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III. Analysis of Lender Locations 
 
A leading reason people choose a lending establishment is location. According to the Federal 
Reserve Board's Survey of Consumer Finances, in 2007 almost half of those surveyed said that 
the location of the institution was the top reason for choosing a place for their main checking 
account, a reason that has increased in importance over the last ten years.70 Surveys of people 
using non-traditional lenders, such as check cashers, also often reported using an establishment 
because of its convenient location.71 
 
Given that people often choose lenders according to their location, it is important to consider 
whether different types of lenders are distributed evenly across a region or whether they favor  
certain neighborhoods. This study compares three metropolitan areas--Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Portland and Seattle and analyzes the distribution of lenders according to the income and racial 
composition of neighborhoods. 
 
The analysis shows that segregated communities of color have poor access to neighborhood 
banks and have far more non-conventional types of lenders that charge much higher rates for 
small loans. Racially segregated communities of color tend to have fewer banks, more check 
cashers and payday lenders, especially in Minneapolis-St. Paul where non-white segregated 
census tracts are more numerous and concentrated in the lower-income core of the region. In 
contrast, there are fewer segregated neighborhoods in Portland and Seattle, and racially 
integrated areas, places with an abundance of banks. 
 
Low income neighborhoods have an abundance of all types of lenders, both bank and payday 
establishments. The abundance of lenders in low income neighborhoods is due in large part to 
their central locations near regional job centers and in areas near or accessible to higher income 
neighborhoods. This is particularly true in Portland and Seattle.  The advantages of a central 
location, however, diminish when potential high income customers are distant from the core of 
the region. This is the case in Minneapolis-St. Paul where there are far fewer banks in the 
residential portions of the central cities and low income neighborhoods. 
 
The regulation of small loan establishments also greatly impacts the number and distribution of 
payday stores in a region. The State of Washington has more leniently regulated payday lenders 
and as a result, Seattle has many more payday establishments than credit unions; twice as many 
per capita payday lenders as Portland and four times as many as Minneapolis-St. Paul.  
 
The leniency of regulation in Washington has also affected the distribution of payday lenders in 
Portland, which is partly in the state. The Washington portion of the Portland metropolitan area 
contains only 18 percent of the region's population, but over 57 percent of the region's payday 
lenders. Notably, payday lenders in all three metropolitan areas are located nearby major 




                                                 
70 Federal Reserve Board (2009),. 




This work uses 2008 lending establishment data from Reference USA for the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Portland and Seattle metropolitan areas. Establishments were selected in Reference USA 
using the primary standard industrial classification (SIC) code for banks, credit unions, check 
cashing services, pawnshops and loan services. Payday lenders were determined by cross 
referencing data from Reference USA with the state regulated small lender lists in Minnesota, 
Oregon and Washington.72  
 
Business establishments in Reference USA are coded by latitude and longitude. This location 
data was used in geographic information systems (GIS) to map the bulk of establishment 
locations. There were a few occurrences where the regulated small lender lists yielded records 
not found in Reference USA. In such cases the records were added to the data set used in the 
analysis. There were also some cases where check cashers and pawnshops in Reference USA 
listed "loans" as a secondary industry classification. In such cases a web-search was performed 
and the establishments were included with the bulk of the records when they advertised payday 
loans on their website. 
 
The study mapped the location of conventional lenders, such as banks and credit unions and non-
conventional lenders, such as payday lenders, other check cashing services and pawnshops. U.S. 
Census data for the household income, racial demographics and census tract boundaries were 
used to generate statistics combining lender data with population data.  GIS was used to overlay 
the locations onto census tracts in order to determine the share of the establishments in low- to 
moderate income and racially integrated and segregated neighborhoods.  
 
Lending establishments and population demographics of central business districts (CBDs) were 
not analyzed in the report. The assumption is that banks in the CBDs are more likely oriented 
towards businesses and workers than residents, and thus are categorically different from banks 
servicing residential areas. Additionally, CBDs have dramatically disproportionate shares of 











                                                 
72 Small lender lists were collected from the Minnesota Department of Commerce, the Oregon Department of 
Consumer and Business Services and the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions. In Minnesota we 
cross-referenced the small lender list and industry and thrift to select payday lenders. 
73 For instance, Seattle's CBDs have 2% of regional population and 18% of the region's banks. There were also large 
discrepancies between different neighborhood types. For instance, in Minneapolis-St. Paul census tracts with 30 to 
50 percent people of color, 69% of banks were in the CBDs, compared to only 7% of the tracts' population. 
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B. Map Analysis 
 
In this section, median household income, percentage people of color and lending establishments 
are mapped for each metropolitan area. This analysis focuses on the location and share of lenders 
within different types of neighborhoods in each of the metros.   
 
Neighborhood (census tract) incomes are scaled by regional household income to control for the 
fact that the three regions differ by income. Low income neighborhoods (defined as census tracts 
with less than 80 percent of the regional median income) are the focus of the analysis.74 These 
types of Low income tracts are more likely to have households facing financial difficulties and 
households receiving assistance through government programs. For comparison purposes, tracts 
with 80 to 100 percent of regional median income are also assessed. 
 
Neighborhoods are also classified by race for the analysis. Racially integrated neighborhoods are 
defined as tracts with 30 to 49 percent people of color. Racially segregated neighborhoods are 
those with more then 50 percent people of color. Racially segregated neighborhoods have faced 
lending discrimination and neighborhood disinvestment, and are often the lowest income areas in 
metropolitan areas. They merit attention for civil rights and fair lending reasons. Integrated 
neighborhoods are also given attention because they are often in transition, experiencing re-
segregation and economic disinvestment. 
 
Finally, the distribution of lenders across different types of municipalities is examined. The 
community classification groups municipalities based on their fiscal characteristics, including tax 
base, poverty, population density, jobs per household, age of the housing stock and population 
growth. The characteristics were chosen to provide a snapshot of communities in two 
dimensions—the ability to raise revenues from local tax bases and the costs associated with its 












                                                 
74The 80 percent cut-off is higher than that used in most work. Low income was initially defined as 50 percent or 
less of  regional median income, but this yielded few neighborhoods for analysis.  
75 The characteristics used to group the municipalities were property tax base per household (2003), poverty rate 
(2000), household growth (1993 to 2003) and household density (2003), jobs per household (2003), and median age 
of the housing stock (2000). All variables were standardized--expressed as the number of standard deviations from 
the mean--to minimize scale effects. Grouping was accomplished using the K-means clustering procedure in SPSS. 
For more on cluster analysis in general, and K-means clustering in particular, see StatSoft, Inc. Electronic Statistics 
Textbook (Tulsa, OK: StatSoft, 2002) at www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html. 
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1. Minneapolis-St. Paul 
 
Low income households and people of color are concentrated in the core of the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul region. These areas have a smaller share of the region's banks, but had much greater shares 
of non-conventional lenders, including payday lenders, check cashers and pawnshops. Racially 
integrated and non-white segregated neighborhoods have disproportionately few banks—their 
shares of regional banks are generally less than half their population shares. Non-white 
segregated neighborhoods show very high shares of non-conventional lenders, especially check 
cashers. Similarly, central cities and fiscally stressed or at-risk suburban areas also have smaller 
regional shares of banks than people, but have larger shares of non-conventional lenders.  
 
Income- In Minneapolis-St. Paul low income neighborhoods (tracts with median income less 
than $43,400) are concentrated in the central cities and in several inner ring suburbs. (Map 1) 
There are also some lower income neighborhoods in the rural periphery of the metropolitan area 
but they represent relatively few households. An important characteristic of the overall pattern is 
that most low income tracts are distant from higher income tracts, which are very sparsely 
represented in the central cities and inner suburbs. 
 
Race- Census tracts with high proportions of people of color are largely concentrated in the cities 
of Minneapolis and St. Paul. (Map 2)  There are also concentrations of people of color to the 
north of Minneapolis in Brooklyn Center and Brooklyn Park, and to the south of Minneapolis in 
Richfield and Bloomington. Integrated neighborhoods often surround segregated neighborhoods, 
and most are rapidly transitioning into segregated neighborhoods.76  There are more non-white 
segregated tracts (68) than integrated tracts (51) in the two cities. 
 
Conventional Lenders- Banks and credit unions cluster near the CBDs and near major highways.  
(Map 3) It is noteworthy that there a relatively few banks and credit unions north of the 
Minneapolis CBD, south of the Minneapolis CBD along the 35W corridor, and east of the St. 
Paul CBD, all places with lower incomes and higher percentages of people of color. 
 
Non-Conventional Lenders- Non-conventional establishments are more centrally located than 
banks and credit unions, with only a scattering of payday lending establishments in the periphery 
of the region. (Map 4) Most of these non-traditional lenders are located in the cities of 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, although there is a cluster of payday lenders in the southern suburbs, 










                                                 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regional Value:  $54,304
Legend
11.6 to 43.3 (205)
43.4 to 54.2 (188)
54.3 to 65.1 (136)
65.2 to 81.4 (135)
81.5 to 142.8 (77)
Note:  Tracts with "No data" had fewer than25 households.
Numbers in $1,000s
(5)No data
Map 1: MINNEAPOLIS - SAINT PAUL REGIONMedian Household Incomeby Census Tract, 1999
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regional Value:  15.2%
Legend
1.6 to 9.9% (389)
10.0 to 19.9% (171)
20.0 to 29.9% (65)
30.0 to 49.9% (51)
50.0 to 96.8% (68)
Note:  Tracts with "No data" had fewer than50 people.
(2)No data
People of Color include all populations






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lenders in Low and Lower-Middle Income Areas: 
Low income neighborhoods have much larger regional shares of non-conventional lenders than 
of banks. While lower income neighborhoods in the region have 23 percent of the regions 
population, they have 21 percent of the regions banks, as illustrated in chart 1. In contrast, lower 
income neighborhoods have 48 percent of the region's payday lenders, 57 percent of check 
cashers and 62 percent of pawn brokers.77  Lower middle income neighborhoods have greater 
shares of banks and much smaller shares of non-conventional lenders than low income 




Lenders in Racially Integrated/Segregated Areas: 
There are relatively few banks in the region’s integrated and non-white segregated 
neighborhoods, compared to their population shares. While about six percent of the region's 
population live in integrated neighborhoods and about seven percent live in non-white segregated 
neighborhoods, only three percent of banks are located in each neighborhood type. (Chart 2)  
 
On the other hand, both integrated and non-white segregated neighborhoods have 
disproportionate shares of credit unions. Non-white segregated neighborhoods however, have 
much larger shares of non-conventional lenders. Segregated neighborhoods have 13 percent of 
the region’s payday lenders, 12 percent of all pawnshops and nearly 30 percent of check cashers.  
 
                                                 
77 In the neighborhoods charts, payday lenders often include check cashers and pawnshops, and check cashers and 
pawnshops include payday lenders. However, not all check cashers and pawnshops are payday lenders, and not all 




Lenders in Different Fiscal Community Types: 
There are relatively few banks in the region’s central cities (excluding CBDs), compared to their 
population shares. While about 22 percent of the region's population lives in the central cities, 
those places contain only ten percent of the region's banks. (Chart 3)  
 
Fiscally at-risk and stressed suburbs also contain a smaller regional share of banks (33 percent) 
than population (39 percent), but larger shares of payday lenders (46 percent) and pawnshops (44 
percent).  More fiscally strong suburban job centers, affluent and bedroom communities, on the 








Portland is a compact and relatively racially integrated region. Concentrations of lower income 
residents and people of color are less pronounced. In addition where low income neighborhoods 
do exist, they are not as underserved by banks as they are in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  However, as 
in Minneapolis-St. Paul, these areas tend to be over-served by non-conventional lenders, and 
racially segregated census tracts, though less numerous than integrated tracts, tend to lack both 
conventional and non-conventional lenders (with the exception of pawn shops).  
 
The relationship between community type and lenders is not as strong in Portland as in the Twin 
Cities. Nevertheless, the city of Portland (outside the CBD) has disproportionately few 
conventional banks and greater shares on non-conventional lenders.  
 
Income- Low income neighborhoods in Portland are located in the northern and eastern portions 
of the city, and across the Columbia River in Vancouver, Washington. (Map 5) There are also 
stretches of lower income tracts in the suburbs west of Portland, from Beaverton to Forest Grove. 
In Portland, many low income tracts are in close proximity to high income tracts located near the 
CBD and in inner suburbs like Beaverton. 
 
Race- Communities of color are located along the northern edge of the city of Portland, north of 
the Portland CBD and clustered along the suburban corridor from Beaverton to Forest Grove. 
(Map 6) Portland is less racially segregated than many metropolitan areas, and has only ten 
census tracts with 50 percent or more people of color, compared to 50 racially integrated tracts 
(with 30 to 49 percent people of color). Most integrated tracts are near to predominately white 
neighborhoods, reflecting a somewhat decentralized spatial pattern of racially diverse areas in 
Portland. 
 
Conventional Lenders- Banks and credit unions are scattered across the region, including along 
the lower income Beaverton-Forest Grove suburban corridor. (Map 7) There are, however, 
relatively few banks in the racially segregated census tracts north of the Portland CBD. 
 
Non-Conventional Lenders- The most distinctive feature of the distribution of non-conventional 
lenders is the relatively high concentration on the Washington side of the region. (Map 8) 
Though the Washington portion of the metropolitan area contains only 18 percent of the region's 
population, it has 57 percent of the region's payday lenders. The strong presence of payday 
lenders in Washington State is indicative of the more lenient state law and regulation towards 



































































































Regional Value:  $47,077
8.2 to 37.6 (97)
37.7 to 47.0 (128)
47.1 to 56.4 (86)
56.5 to 70.5 (82)
70.6 to 111.1 (28)
Numbers in $1,000s



























































































People of Color include all populations
except single race non-Hispanic whites.
Regional Value:  18.5%
Legend
3.3 to 9.9% (103)
10.0 to 19.9% (172)
20.0 to 29.9% (86)
30.0 to 49.9% (50)



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lenders in Low and Lower Middle Income Areas: 
In Portland both low and lower middle income neighborhoods are well served by banks and 
credit unions. (Chart 4) Low income neighborhoods, for instance have 19 percent of the region’s 
population, 31 percent of the region's banks and 39 percent of the credit unions. Unlike moderate 
income areas, however, lower income neighborhoods tend to have even larger shares of non-
conventional lenders. Low income neighborhoods have twice the share of payday lenders (44 
percent) and check cashers (51 percent) and three times as many pawnshops (57 percent) as they 
have population (19 percent). The concentration of non-conventional lenders in low income parts 
of Vancouver, Washington, undoubtedly influences the trend of unconventional lenders in the 




Lenders in Racially Integrated/Segregated Areas: 
Integrated neighborhoods in the Portland region tend to have slightly more lenders of all types, 
while segregated neighborhoods tend to lack lenders of all types. (Chart 5) Racially integrated 
tracts in Portland contain 12 percent of the region's population, the same share of credit unions 
and 18 percent of the region's banks. The shares of non-conventional lenders in integrated 
neighborhoods are roughly proportional to the population share and do not differ much from the 
shares of conventional lenders.  
 
The share of people living in Portland's segregated neighborhoods is very small (just two 
percent) and the neighborhoods have even smaller shares of most types of lending institutions. 





Lenders in Different Fiscal Community Types: 
Banks in the Portland region are more concentrated in suburban areas than the central cities. 
While the city of Portland has 32 percent of the region's population it contains only 24 percent of 
the banks. (Chart 6) Conversely, the city of Portland has larger shares of non-conventional 
lenders, especially check cashers, 41 percent of which are in Portland. The city also has a slightly 
larger share of credit unions than population.  Suburban areas have greater regional shares of 
banks than population, but also have some larger shares of non-conventional lenders. For at-risk 
and stressed suburbs, there are larger shares of check-cashers (32 percent) than population (25 
percent); and for suburban job centers, affluent and bedroom communities, the regional share of 
payday lenders (23 percent) is larger than the share of population (14 percent) 
 
 
Note: because of the small number of communities in the Washington portion of the 
Portland metropolitan area, only the Oregon portion of the state is included in the 
analysis. Shares in the charts do not add up to 100, because there are unincorporated 





Seattle is also a relatively compact and integrated region, and in areas where there are higher 
percentages of low income residents and people of color, there are also relatively large shares of 
lenders. Low income neighborhoods show disproportionate shares of all types of lenders, with 
slightly greater shares of non-conventional lenders than conventional ones. Both racially 
integrated and segregated neighborhoods show lender shares similar to their population shares. 
Most noteworthy in Seattle is the sheer number of payday lenders, which far outnumber the 
region's credit unions.  
 
The relationship between community type and lender locations is mixed. Both non-conventional 
and conventional lenders are over-represented in at-risk and stressed suburbs while central cities 
had smaller shares of lenders of every type and more affluent suburbs had larger shares of every 
type.  
 
Income- Low income neighborhoods in Seattle tend to form a band across the isthmus that 
contains the city of Seattle, including parts of the city and suburbs directly to the north (e.g. 
Everett) and south (e.g. Kent). (Map 9) Lower income tracts tend to be relatively close to upper 
income tracts, while lower income neighborhoods on the southern part of the isthmus are 
separated from wealthy suburbs by Lake Washington. The north side of Seattle city has a mix of 
low, middle and high income census tracts. 
 
Race- In a manner similar to income, racially integrated neighborhoods tend to form a band 
across the isthmus that contains Seattle and into suburbs to the north and south of the city. (Map 
10) Additionally, there is a band of integrated tracts in wealthier sections of the region on the 
east side of Lake Washington. Many of these neighborhoods are in close proximity to 
predominately white neighborhoods. 
 
Seattle also has a cluster of segregated tracts on the south side of the city, surrounded by 
integrated tracts. Although there are more segregated tracts in Seattle than in Portland, Seattle 
has less than half the number of segregated tracts (34) as integrated tracts (82), a much smaller 
ratio than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. 
 
Conventional Lenders- Conventional lenders cluster in a north-south orientation mirroring the 
built up portions of the region. (Map 11) However, there are areas where conventional lenders 
are absent, notably in the wealthier eastern fringes of the urbanized area and in the low income 
southwest section of the city of Seattle. Regionally, there are many fewer credit unions (132) 
than banks (812). 
 
Non-Conventional Lenders- Seattle has many payday lenders. Though they are distributed 
throughout the region, they tend to cluster closer to major highways than do banks. (Map 12) 
Notably, there are many more payday lenders in the region (204) than in Minneapolis-St. Paul 



















































































Map 9: SEATTLE PRIMARY REGIONMedian Household Incomeby Census Tract, 1999
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Regional Value:  $52,804
11.3 to 42.1 (114)
42.3 to 52.7 (109)
52.8 to 63.3 (122)
63.4 to 79.1 (111)
79.2 to 133.8 (51)
Numbers in $1,000s


















































































Map 10: SEATTLE PRIMARY REGIONPercentage People of Colorby Census Tract, 2000
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Regional Value:  24.1%
Legend
3.3 to 9.9% (77)
10.0 to 19.9% (194)
20.0 to 29.9% (120)
30.0 to 49.9% (82)
50.0 to 90.9% (34)
People of Color include all populations
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Map 12: SEATTLE PRIMARY REGIONPayday Lenders, Other Check Cashingand Pawn Brokers by Location, 2008
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Lenders in Low and Lower Middle Income Areas: 
In Seattle low income neighborhoods contain disproportionate shares of all types of lenders. 
(Chart 7) However, the largest shares in lower income areas are for non-conventional lenders, 
especially pawnshops. While low income areas contain 23 percent of the population in the 
region, they contain 55 to 72 percent of non-conventional lenders. Lower middle income 
neighborhoods, on the other hand, show roughly proportionate shares of lending establishments, 
with somewhat greater shares of both banks and pawnbrokers. 
 
 
Lenders in Racially Integrated/Segregated Areas: 
Seattle’s integrated neighborhoods also show disproportionate shares of every type of lender, but 
particularly non-conventional lenders. Segregated neighborhoods, on the other hand, show 
roughly proportionate shares. (Chart 8) While integrated neighborhoods have 18 percent of the 
regions population, they have 25 percent of banks, 42 percent of credit unions, 34 percent of 




Lenders in Different Fiscal Community Types: 
There are relatively smaller shares of lenders of all types in the City of Seattle. While Seattle has 
23 percent of the region's population it has only 18 percent of the region's banks and payday 
lenders, 19 percent of the region's credit unions and check cashers and ten percent of the region's 
pawnshops. (Chart 9)  More fiscally strong suburban job centers, affluent and bedroom 
communities, on the other hand, have slightly larger lender shares of all types compared to the 
their share of population. 
 
There are much greater shares for all types of lenders, especially non-conventional lenders, in 
Seattle's at-risk and stressed suburbs. These suburbs have 29 percent of the region's population, 
34 percent of the region's banks and 37 percent of the region's credit unions. Much larger are the 
shares of payday lenders (50 percent), check cashers (47 percent) and pawnshops (44 percent) in 
at-risk and stressed suburbs. 
 
Shares in the charts do not add up to 100, because there are unincorporated areas 

















C. Comparisons across the Metropolitan Areas 
 
There are major differences across the three regions in the neighborhood shares of lenders by 
income and race. Lower income neighborhoods in Portland and Seattle showed much greater 
access to conventional lenders than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. However, non-conventional lenders 
tend to be disproportionately in lower income neighborhoods in all three metros.  
 
The fact that there is more urban sprawl and social separation in Minneapolis-St. Paul helps to 
explain the difference in shares of banks in the regions' low income neighborhoods. In Portland 
and Seattle, banks gain an accessibility advantage by being centrally located. While those central 
locations are often in lower income neighborhoods where many customers have smaller 
borrowing capacity, they are in close proximity to higher income neighborhoods where there are 
more credit worthy customers. In Minneapolis-St. Paul the advantage of being centrally located 
is offset by the fact that central locations are often distant from higher income neighborhoods.  
 
Sprawl and social separation in Minneapolis-St. Paul also contribute to racial biases in 
accessibility of conventional credit. There are disproportionately small shares of banks and 
disproportionately large shares of non-conventional lenders in Minneapolis-St. Paul's non-white 
segregated neighborhoods, tracts that also are more numerous than in Portland or Seattle. In 
comparison, Portland had very few segregated tracts and Seattle's segregated tracts, also less 
numerous, had similar shares of population and lenders of all types. 
 
There were some similarities between the metros when considering neighborhood shares of 
lenders. In all three regions, low income neighborhoods have larger regional shares of non-
conventional lenders than conventional lenders. For conventional lenders, there were larger 
shares of credit unions than banks in all three metros' low income areas. This was also true in 
racially integrated and segregated non-white neighborhoods in the Twin Cities, where regional 
shares of credit unions were larger than the shares of banks or population. 
 
Lending Establishments Per Capita 
 
When considering the sheer number of establishments in different neighborhoods it's clear that 
there are differing levels of access to lenders. In all three metros racially segregated 
neighborhoods have few overall lenders, and the number of non-conventional lending 
establishments meets or exceeds the number of banks and credit unions. Conversely, low income 
neighborhoods tend to have more lenders, particularly in Portland and Seattle, and have more 
banks and credit unions than non-conventional lenders.  
 
To understand lending patterns in metropolitan areas it is important to know how many lenders 
there are per population in an area. Neighborhoods that have a large share of lenders in a region 
could have small per capita rates of lenders, that is, few lenders per resident, if there are few 
overall lenders in the region.  
 
The per capita measure used in this study is crucial for comparing the regions to one another, 
because there were differences in the number of lenders in the regions. Seattle, for instance, has 
many more payday lenders than do Minneapolis-St. Paul, even though Seattle has a smaller 
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population. In this case, neighborhoods with a small share of payday lenders in Seattle would 
have more per capita payday lenders than neighborhoods with the same small share of lenders in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.  
 
Regional Lenders Per Capita 
In all three metropolitan areas there are more banks per 100,000 persons than all other types of 
lenders combined. (Chart 10) Of the three metros, Seattle has the smallest number of banks per 
capita. Seattle also has fewer credit unions per capita and greater numbers of non-conventional 
lenders per capita than Minneapolis-St. Paul or Portland. Seattle has 8 payday lenders per 
100,000 persons, two times the per capita rate of payday lenders in Portland and four times the 
rate of Minneapolis-St. Paul. Seattle also has about twice the rate of check cashers and 
pawnshops than Minneapolis-St. Paul and Portland. 
 
 
Lenders Per Capita in Low Income Neighborhoods 
There are a disproportionate per capita number of all types of lenders in low income areas 
compared to the regional total in Portland and Seattle. (Chart 11) In Minneapolis-St. Paul there 
are roughly the same number of banks per capita number in low income neighborhoods as in the 
region as a whole. Non-conventional lenders were especially common in Seattle's lower income 
neighborhoods, with an even greater rate of payday lenders and rate of check cashers than credit 
unions. Still, there were more than twice as many banks as payday lenders and check cashers in 
Seattle's low income neighborhoods. In Minneapolis-St. Paul and Portland, banks were also 







Lenders Per Capita in Racially Integrated Neighborhoods 
Portland's and Seattle's integrated neighborhoods have more lenders per capita than average for 
their regions, but fewer lenders than their low income neighborhoods. (Chart 12) For instance, in 
Seattle there were 33 banks per 100,000 people in integrated neighborhoods, compared to 23 per 
100,000 in the region as a whole and 51 per 100,000 in lower income areas. Portland also had 
slightly fewer per capita banks in integrated neighborhoods than in low income neighborhoods.  
 
Minneapolis-St. Paul's integrated neighborhoods, however, had very few banks. While there 
were 26 banks per 100,000 people in the region as a whole, there were only 15 in racially 
integrated neighborhoods. Minneapolis-St. Paul also had relatively few non-conventional types 






Lenders Per Capita in Racially Segregated Neighborhoods 
Non-white segregated neighborhoods in all three metros lacked conventional lenders. (Chart 13) 
Seattle had the largest number of banks in segregated neighborhoods of the three metros with 21 
per 100,000, but this was still less than the regional rate of 23. Seattle also had a slightly higher 
rate of non-conventional lenders than the region as a whole. In Portland, there were relatively 
few lenders of any type in segregated neighborhoods. 
 
Segregated neighborhoods in Minneapolis-St. Paul lack conventional lenders, but have high rates 
of non-conventional lenders. In fact, there were almost as many check cashers per capita (16 per 
100,000) as banks and credit unions combined (17 per 100,000). The area also had 2.5 times the 
number of payday lenders per capita in segregated neighborhoods as the region as a whole. The 
lack of conventional lenders and presence of non-conventional lenders in Minneapolis-St. Paul’s 
segregated neighborhoods is especially troubling, given that segregated neighborhoods are more 


















IV. Analysis of Borrower Access to Prime Mortgage Lenders 
 
The prior section shows the disparities within and across the three metropolitan areas in the 
availability of lenders of various types. Compared to other types of neighborhoods, access to 
conventional lenders in lower income and integrated neighborhoods was clearly better in the 
Portland and Seattle metros than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. In the two western metros, these types 
of neighborhoods contained disproportionate shares of conventional banks. In Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, on the other hand, integrated and non-white segregated neighborhoods were particularly 
disadvantaged in this regard. 
 
This section explores how these differences affect consumer access to conventional, or prime, 
lenders. The analysis compares how often borrowers in different types of neighborhoods actually 
use prime lenders, according to neighborhood income and racial diversity. The necessary data for 
small loans needed to fully examine the use of non-conventional lenders are not available. The 
analysis therefore focuses on conventional lenders—banks—and home mortgage borrowing 
patterns.  
 
Similar to the division of small loan establishments into conventional and non-conventional 
lenders, home mortgage lenders are divided into two types—prime and sub-prime lenders.  
Prime lenders typically make lower interest loans through bank branch locations while subprime 
lenders usually make higher interest loans working through mortgage brokers. To determine how  
lender services are available to borrowers in different types of neighborhoods, this section 
compares usage rates for prime lenders to neighborhood characteristics, including income and  
race.  
 
The analysis shows clear-cut relationships in each of the metros between usage rates of prime 
lenders and the racial make-up and income of areas. Prime lending application rates are lower in 
areas with more people of color and lower incomes. The patterns are particularly stark in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul where prime lender application rates fall off more dramatically as 
neighborhood income falls or as neighborhood non-white shares increase. 
 
A. Data and Methods. 
 
This section analyzes Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to derive how often 
borrowers access prime lenders in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland and Seattle. This work uses 
HMDA data for 2004 through 2006. HMDA was enacted in 1975 by the U.S. congress in 
response to the exclusion of racial minorities in the marketing and lending of home mortgages. 
HMDA requires a large majority of lending institutions (about 80 percent) to report their loan 
application transactions. The data are collected and recorded in an electronic database; and stored 
by the U.S. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 
 
HMDA records show mortgage application data matched with the race and income of the 
applicants, the purpose of the loan, the outcome, the name of the mortgage lender and the 
location of the borrower. HMDA was amended in 2004 to address the increasing rate of high-
cost loan activity in the mortgage market to require identification of loans that are three 
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percentage points above the prevailing quarterly treasury rate. This work uses this flag to identify 
subprime loans. 
 
Other HMDA information include whether the mortgage was a first or second lien mortgage; if 
the loan request was for an owner or rental unit; whether the mortgaged property was a 1-4 unit, 
manufactured or multifamily property; and if the loan was a conventional or government-backed 
loan. Only records for first-lien, conventional, 1-4 unit owner properties were included for this 
analysis. HMDA records that were determined by FFIEC to have edit quality issues were also 
excluded.  
 
Mortgage lenders tend to specialize either in prime lending or subprime lending. For the 
purposes of this work, a prime lender was defined as a bank issuing more than 90 percent prime 




In this section neighborhood level prime-lender application rates are compared to neighborhood 
racial and income characteristics to evaluate whether there are relationships between lending 
behavior and neighborhood attributes in the three metropolitan areas. Overall, prime-lender 
application rates decline as income declines and as non-white population shares increase in each 
of the metropolitan areas. However, the underlying neighborhood characteristics and the 
strengths of the various relationships vary from metro to metro. The trade-offs between prime-
lender rates and neighborhood characteristics are sharpest in Minneapolis-At. Paul. 
 
1. Minneapolis-St. Paul 
 
There is a strong relationship between prime lender application rates, the income and racial 
composition of neighborhoods in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Application rates to prime lenders are 
sharply lower in census tracts with greater shares of people of color and lower incomes. 
 
People of color in segregated neighborhoods are especially affected by lack of access to prime 
lenders. This mirrors the results from the prior section that showed excessive numbers of payday 
lenders and an absence of banks in segregated communities of color. In Minneapolis-St. Paul the 
social separation of higher income households from the core of the region, spawned by urban 
sprawl, may contribute to the lack of conventional banks in neighborhoods of color in the core of 
the region.  
 
Prime Lender Application Rates and Race 
The relationships between prime lender application rates, race and income are shown in Tables 2 
and 3. Application rates are very sensitive to the racial mix of neighborhoods. The prime lender 
share drops by about five percentage points for every 10 point increase in the population share 
for people of color. In non-white segregated neighborhoods—tracts with a non-white share 






Prime Lender Application Rates and Income 
Prime lender rates are equally sensitive to neighborhood incomes. In neighborhoods with median 
household incomes between $40,000 and 80,000, a $10,000 difference in income is associated 
with a three to four point difference in prime lender application rates. Just one-third of 
applications in the poorest neighborhoods—tracts with median household incomes less than 





These relationships translate into a very clear geographic pattern. (Map 13) Prime lending 
application rates are very clearly highest in the region’s higher-income second ring suburbs. 
Lowest rates are concentrated in large parts of the two central cities, inner suburbs northwest and 




















































































































































































































































































































































































Regional Value:  59.7%
Legend
13.2 to 39.9% (147)
40.0 to 49.9% (198)
50.0 to 59.9% (199)
60.0 to 69.9% (152)
70.0 to 82.4% (43)
No data





The Portland metro also shows clear relationships between prime lender application rates, 
income and  racial composition. As in Minneapolis-St. Paul, application rates to prime lenders 
are notably lower in census tracts with greater shares of people of color and lower incomes. 
However, there are distinctly fewer tracts with very low prime lender application rates in 
Portland.  
 
Prime Lender Application Rates and Race  
Although there is a clear relationship between race and prime lending rates in Portland metro 
neighborhoods, the tradeoff is not nearly as severe as in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Prime application 
rates are clearly higher in more diverse neighborhoods, but the difference between the most 
diverse group and the least diverse is just 13 percentage points—46 percent compared to 59 
percent. The equivalent range in Minneapolis-St. Paul is 30 percentage points—54 percent 
compared to 24 percent. In addition, because there are fewer non-white segregated tracts in 
Portland, the number of affected applications is considerably lower—17,500 total applications in 
the two highest diversity categories of Table 4 (Portland) compared to 40,400 applications in 






Prime Lender Application Rates and Income  
The application rate-income relationship in Portland is also clear and looks much like that seen 
in Minneapolis-St. Paul. (Table 5) The range of prime lender rates is a bit narrower—a 
difference of 26 percentage points between the highest and lowest categories compared to 32 
points in the Twin Cities—and prime lender rates are higher on average in Portland, but the 











Geographic Patterns  
There is also a distinct geographic pattern to prime application rates in Portland. The highest 
rates are concentrated in a band of suburban areas along the west bank of the Willamette River 
west and south of the city of Portland. (Map 14)  Areas with lower prime application rates can be 
found across the region but are particularly concentrated on the north and east sides of Portland 
city. The clear difference between Portland and Minneapolis-St. Paul is the smaller number of 



















































































































Regional Value:  55.9%
Legend
30.3 to 39.9% (24)
40.0 to 49.9% (110)
50.0 to 59.9% (139)
60.0 to 69.9% (80)
70.0 to 88.3% (65)
No data





As expected, the Seattle also shows relationships across neighborhoods between prime lender 
application rates, income and racial diversity. As in the other metros prime lender application 
rate are lower in low income areas and more racially diverse areas. However, the relationships 
are not as strong in Seattle as in the other metros. 
 
Prime Lender Application Rates and Race 
Although racially diverse areas tend to show lower prime application rates in Seattle, the tradeoff 
is not as distinct as in the other metros. The spread from most diverse to least diverse areas is less 
than 10 percentage points and the application rates do not uniformly decline as neighborhood 
diversity increases. (Table 6)  Prime lender rates are actually higher, for instance, in 
neighborhoods with non-white shares between 10 and 20 percent than in areas with non-white 





Prime Lender Application Rates and Income 
The range of prime lender application rates is also comparatively narrow across most of the 
income distribution in Seattle. (Table 7) The range from the lowest income group—less than 
$40,000—to the second highest group is just 10 points. The jump from the second highest to the 







Geographic Patterns  
Seattle's home mortgage borrowers tend to apply more often at prime lenders in the center of the 
region and less often in the northern and southern reaches of the area. (Map 15) The northern and 
southern portions of Seattle's isthmus, areas with many of the region’s lower income households 













































































































Map 15: SEATTLE PRIMARY REGIONPercentage of Applicants Applying atPrime Lenders by Census Tract, 2004-2006
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Regional Value:  50.8%
Legend
22.4 to 39.9% (122)
40.0 to 49.9% (110)
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Note:  Tracts with "No data" had fewer than25 mortgage applications.
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C. Comparisons across the Metropolitan Areas 
 
As noted in the previous section, the relationships between prime lender application rates and 
neighborhood demographics tend to be most distinct in Minneapolis-St. Paul. However, this does 
not mean that the relationships do not exist in the Portland and Seattle areas. There are relatively 
clear application rate differences across neighborhood types in each of the metros, with areas that 
have lower incomes and higher shares of people of color in the comparison. 
 
Neighborhood Prime Lending and Race 
The Minneapolis-St. Paul metro shows a trade-off between neighborhood diversity and prime 
lender application rates that is clearly stronger than in the other two metropolitan areas. (Chart 
11) The difference lies largely in the region’s neighborhoods with the highest non-white shares. 
Prime lender rates are similar across the metros at high incomes, but the rates decline much more 
sharply as racial diversity increases in the Twin Cities. The result is that prime lender application 





Neighborhood Prime Lending and Income 
The three metros look much more similar when comparing the relationship between prime lender 
application rates and income. (Chart 12)  The application rate trade-offs with income—the slopes 
of the three lines—are very similar, except that Minneapolis-St. Paul shows a much steeper drop-





V. Equal Access to Credit  
  
Families living in segregated communities of color are disproportionately unlikely to apply for 
prime loans, to live near a traditional bank, and disproportionately more likely to live near a non-
conventional or payday lender. The racial composition of neighborhoods is related to access to 
good, affordable credit. In low income communities of color, high cost loans— both in the home 
mortgage market and small consumer loan market—are much more common than they are in 
white and middle-class communities. Poor people of color pay more for loans—an extra cost that 
many families can ill-afford. Some of this cost can be attributed to the higher risk involved in 
lending to some low income people. However, civil rights laws are implicated in this lending to 
the extent the banks make their services less available or market higher cost loans specifically 
marketed to communities of color. One civil rights law, the Community Reinvestment Act, can 
be used proactively to encourage banks to make low-cost loans available in communities of 
color.  
  
Federal Fair Lending Regulation  
 
In 2005, the FDIC issued draft guidelines on payday lending. One of the dangers to the financial 
stability of banking institutions involved in payday lending was the potential for lawsuits for 
violations of anti-discrimination and consumer protection law. The draft guidelines directed 
examiners to “determine to whom the products are marketed, and how the rates or fees for each 
program are set, and whether there is evidence of potential discrimination.”78 
 
While some of the racial disparities in the location of payday lenders described in the previous 
section may be related to nondiscriminatory market forces, the fact remains that large racial 
disparities in lending should not exist. Years of housing discrimination and redlining led to an 
impressive body of anti-discrimination law, most of which applies to equal access to fair credit, 
including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)79 and the Community Reinvestment Act.  
 
Racially targeted subprime or predatory loans obviously invoke civil rights laws, most notably 
the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Likewise, racially targeting of high-
cost payday loans, including location decisions based on neighborhood racial demographics 
could violate the ECOA. The ECOA bans discrimination against applicants in respect to any 
credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or martial status or age.  
 
The lack of traditional banks lenders in communities of color could also positively violate the 
ECOA. Traditional banks, such as Bank of America and Wells Fargo, extend lines of credit to 
payday lenders.80 These lines of credit allow payday lenders to, in turn, make loans. This 
arrangement is similar to banks’ extension of credit to mortgage brokers—federal regulators 
                                                 
78 FDIC FIL-14-2005, “Guidelines for Payday Lending,” (Feb. 25, 2005) available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html (last visited July 15, 2009). 
79 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and Sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Acts when their actions make 
housing, credit, or contract rights unavailable because of the plaintiff’s protected class.42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 
(2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908; See Schemm, (1995).  
80 National Consumer Law Center (2007). These loans and lines of credit are also available in publicly traded 
Payday lenders SEC filings.  
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have warned banks that this practice could violate fair lending laws.81 Federal antidiscrimination 
law holds these secondary market participants liable for condoning discrimination in the primary 
market. While the official staff commentary to the ECOA regulation B expressly indicates that 
secondary market participants’ purchase of loans can violate the ECOA insofar as the purchaser 
influences the outcome of the loan. However, under the ECOA “term creditor includes all 
persons participating in the credit decision,”82 which should include the bank that made the line 
of credit available to the payday lender. To the extent that traditional banks make lines of credit 
available to payday lenders that they know target communities of color, the elderly, disabled, or 
women for high cost or otherwise predatory loans, these banks might violate the ECOA.  
 
Further, anti-discrimination law can be violated when a bank has both payday and other short 
term lending programs that carry considerably dissimilar rates of interest or pricing structures.83 
For instance, banks decisions not to enter the lending market in a community of color, but to 
provide a line of credit to payday lenders that do –effectively leading to one sort of credit for 
communities of color and another for white communities—could be argued violate the ECOA.  
 
The Community Reinvestment Act 
 
In 1977, Congress passed the Community Revitalization Act (CRA), which was designed to 
eliminate redlining and encourage investment in impacted communities by “encourag[ing] 
regulated financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound 
operations.”84  
 
In the home mortgage market, research finds that CRA covered institutions are much less likely 
to make high-cost loans to low-moderate income borrowers than lenders that are not covered by 
the CRA.85 Moreover, communities with more CRA-covered lenders (usually traditional banks) 
experience more prime lending and fewer foreclosures than communities with few covered 
lenders.86 In other words, research suggests that federal laws that put pressure of traditional 
lending institutions to make good-quality, affordable loans to LMI families actually work.  
 
In recent years, federal agencies have become more interested in promoting affordable small, 
short terms loans though the CRA.87  In 2008, the FDIC launched the Small Dollar Loan Pilot 
program. The program rewards banks that make payday-sized loans at affordable interest rates. 
The APR on these loans is capped at 36 percent and must contain an automatic savings 
component. The FDIC states that lending programs that help move families away from payday 
loans “would be considered particularly responsive to community needs.”88 
 
                                                 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 100.125(b) (2007); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(l), 
Official Staff Commentary § 202.2(l). 
82 Official Staff Commentary § 202.2 2(l) 1.  
83 ECOA regulation B. 
84 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2005). 
85 Paying More for the American Dream III (2009) 
86 FDIC Issues Final Guidelines on Affordable Small-Dollar Loans, June 19, 2007. 
87 Affordable Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines, available at http://www.fdic.gov/SmallDollarLoans/. 
88 Ibid. 
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VI.  Payday Lending Reform 
 
At its worst payday lending is comparable to early twentieth century loan sharking. at its best, it 
is comparable to micro finance projects carried out in the global South.89 While the practice is 
not exactly loan sharking—no one will actually come break your legs if you do not pay back 
your payday loan (although they may harass you and/or take you to court)—the practice is also 
far from the microfinance model which is intended to allow families to start businesses and 
increase their long-term standard of living. Payday lending is associated with a host of public and 
private costs including an increased risk of bankruptcy.90  
 
In the 1990s, the Consumer Federation of America and USPIRG began to raise the alarm about 
the costs of payday lending.91 These concerns and growing public discomfort about the debt-trap 
created by payday loans has led most states that permit payday lending to enact some sort of 
regulation. Several states, including Oregon, have capped the interest rate on payday loans. 
Others, like Washington, have attempted to limit rollovers. While the bans on roll-over and 
“cooling off” periods between payday loans tend to be easier to pass in state legislatures—these 
bills tend to be supported by the payday loan industry—rate caps are the most effective means of 
reducing the cost of payday lending. 
 
State Regulation: Rate Caps 
 
In 2001, North Carolina, one of the first states to legalize payday lending, became the first to re-
ban it. In 2007, Oregon passed rate caps that effectively ban traditional payday loans. In the 
wake of these bans, several industry-sponsored studies examined their effects. These studies 
tended to find that consumers were worse off.92 Studies by other academics and advocacy groups 
tend to refute the industry-sponsored studies and find that the rate-caps had little effect on the 
borrowing habits of consumers.93 
 
North Carolina allowed its payday lending legislation to sunset in 2001, effectively capping the 
interest on small loans, those under $600, at 36%.94 North Carolina’s Attorney General then 
aggressively prosecuted payday lenders, such as Advance America, that continued to do business 
in the state.95 By 2006, the last payday lenders operating in the state agreed to end operations.96 
Because North Carolina was a pioneer both with the advent of payday lending and its 
abolishment, and because the state has been particularly persistent about actually ending payday 
lending within the state, the state experience has been extensively studied. In fact, The Center for 
Responsible Lending, one of the advocacy groups that first blew the whistle on payday lending is 
                                                 
89 See Douglas McGray, Check Cashers, Redeemed., New York Times, Nov. 9, 2008. 
90 Skiba (2008). 
91 Consumer Federation of America (1998). 
92 Donald P. Morgan and Michael R. Strain (2007). 
93 Center for Community Capital (2007). 
94 North Carolina Consumer Finance Act. N/C/G/S/ § 53-15. 
95 North Carolina Attorney General, Press Release. March 1, 2006 “Payday Lending on the Way Out in North 
Carolina: AG Cooper says major payday lenders agree to stop loans.” 
96 Ibid. 
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located in Durham, North Carolina. In 2005, the Center released a report finding concentrations 
of payday lenders in communities of color in North Carolina.97  
 
After the lending ban, advocacy groups, industry groups, and scholars examined the outcome of 
the payday loan ban for North Carolina consumers. The Center for Community Capital at the 
University of North Carolina examined the availability of credit for North Carolina families, and 
found that very few households were impacted by the end of payday lending.98 The study also 
found that former payday borrowers were pleased with the payday ban.99 
 
Donald Morgan Strain, a researcher affiliated with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 
Michael Stain, however, found more bounced checks, complaints to federal authorities about 
lenders and debt collectors, and more federal bankruptcy filings in North Carolina and Georgia 
(both of which had payday bans) than in states that allowed high-cost payday lending.100 The 
Morgan study has been criticized for failing to note that the regional check processing centers, 
where the researchers got their data on bounced checks, are regional processing centers.101 This 
means that half the data on bounced checks used to illustrate the increase in bounced checks in 
North Carolina actually came from states that allow payday lending.102  
 
Similarly, Morgan and Strain study’s data concerning bankruptcy filings do not account for the 
broad changes in the bankruptcy code that occurred during the study.103 The data about the 
increase in complaints about debt collectors was also problematic: the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act allows consumers to complain about third party debt collectors, but not about the 
lender.104 Since many payday lenders keep their collection efforts in-house, these complaints 
were not collected by the FTC, the federal regulator.105  
 
Overall, it seems that North Carolina’s regulation has lowered the number of high cost loans 
taken out in the state without substantially increasing bank overdrafts or other problematic 
alternatives to payday loans.  
 
State Regulations: Methods Other than Rate Caps 
 
Other states, like Washington have implemented a bevy of payday lending regulations short of 
rate-caps. These regulations have included limits on the number of payday loans a borrower can 
have outstanding, cooling-off periods between loans, and lender disclosure requirements. Many 
of these reforms have been advocated by payday lenders as alternatives to rate-caps.106 However, 
                                                 
97 Kind et al. (2005) 
98 Center for Community capital (2007).  
99 Ibid at 17.  
100 Morgan and Strain (2007) 
101 Center for Responsible Lending (December 10, 2007). 
102 Ibid.  
103 The study also only controlled the bankruptcy data for unemployment, and not for a host of other usually 
controlled, relevant factors, such as income, and health insurance rates. Ibid.  
104 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692 
105 Ibid.  
106 See Community Financial Services Association of America, “Best Practices for the Payday Advance Industry,” 
available at http://www.cfsa.net/industry_best_practices.html. 
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research by the Center for Responsible Lending found that only interest rate caps at or around 36 
percent, the amount set by North Carolina and the federal government’s cap for lending to 
military families, prevents borrowers from becoming trapped in cycles of repeat borrowing or 
loan flipping.107 Other measures, including those used in Minnesota and Washington, such as 
renewable bans, cooling-off periods, payment plans, loan caps based on borrower’s income, 
state-wide databases, and regulations that narrowly target only payday loans have not stopped 




Payday and other high cost lenders, along with some economists, often argue that regulation of 
loan terms and bank locations is unnecessary. The solution, they argue, is consumer education. 
Provide consumers with information about good and bad loans and rational consumers will make 
the choices that are best for their families.  The purpose of the federal Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) is to create informed consumers by requiring lenders to provide true estimates of loan 
costs. The act reads: “The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by 
consumers. It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and 
avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair 
credit billing and credit card practices.”108 The act applies to most loans and requires disclosure 
of the cost of the loan in terms of APR. 
 
Most payday lenders comply with TILA, and many state laws including the laws of 
Minnesota,109 Oregon,110 and Washington111 either require TILA disclosures or require TILA 
plus even more disclosures. For example, Minnesota requires payday lenders to post signs stating 
that borrowers could get the same loan for less elsewhere.112 All three states require conspicuous 
posting of fees and charges, both on websites and offices, as well as on customers’ receipts. 
Payday lenders have largely supported these provisions, in part, perhaps, because they do not 
work.113 
 
TILA and state laws exceeding TILA give consumers volumes of information about the cost of 
the respective loans and give information that creates the possibility of consumers comparison 
shopping for loans. However, there is little evidence that providing consumers with “disclosure 
and unfettered choice” leads to financially sound consumer choices.114 While consumer 
disclosures appear to be a tool to strengthen consumer rights there is little evidence that either 
consumer disclosures or consumer education leads to better financial decision-making.115 
 
                                                 
107 Urian King and Leslie Parrish, Springing the Debt Trap (2007) 
108 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.. 
1092008  Minnesota Statutes Section 47.60, subdivision 4(e). 
110 2007 Oregon Revised Statutes section 725.345.  
111 Revised Code of Washington 31.45.060. 
112 2008  Minnesota Statutes Section 47.60, subdivision 4(e). 
113 See Community Financial Services Association of America, “Best Practices for the Payday Advance Industry 
,”available at http://www.cfsa.net/industry_best_practices.html (last visited July 15, 2009).  
114 Willies (2008). 
115 Ibid., Barr et al. (2008). 
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In the case of payday lending, it is even less likely that in-store disclosures or consumer 
education campaigns will effectively steer families away from unaffordable payday loans. 
Consumers who seek payday loans are already facing serious, unexpected financial shortfalls. 
Even economists do not expect rational market decisions from payday borrowers116—payday 
borrowers borrow from these lenders because they overestimate their ability to repay loans.117  
 
While requiring payday lenders to comply with federal truth in lending regulations may make 
states think that they are giving borrowers the tools to make sound decisions, the truth is that 
borrowers facing a financial shock are usually not in a position to effectively evaluate the 
relative costs and benefits of taking out these loans. The social costs of these debt-traps were the 
reason why salary assignments (otherwise known as loans sharking) were prohibited over 100 
years ago in most states.  
 
Effectively Unregulated: Internet Lending 
 
While high-cost payday loans are generally unavailable at store fronts in many states, these high 
cost loans are available on the internet. Internet payday loans, tout fast-approval, no background 
checks, and immediate cash. A 2004 survey by the Consumer Federation of America of internet 
payday lenders found that internet disclosures often misstate APR’s, do not include the finance 
fees in the APR, and generally make it difficult for consumers to access the true cost of the 
payday loan.118 Many internet sites allow renewal without limits and some actually automatically 
refinance loans.119 
 
Most states, including Oregon and Washington, in theory regulate payday lenders under the same 
rules as payday lenders within the state.120 In practice, states have difficulty regulating payday 
lenders. While a few states have convinced courts to apply their consumer protection laws and 
payday lending regulations to payday lenders,121 in practice internet payday lenders offer loans to 
consumers, even in states that ban payday lending.122 In a few states, state attorney generals have 
gotten cease and desist orders against payday lenders. However, payday lenders, much like 
online gambling sites, continue to make loans to consumers in these states. While the loan 
companies may not be able to collect on these loans in court, most payday customers pay most of 
the loan and added fees before defaulting.123 Further, since many of these on-line lenders have 
mandatory arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts and some even require consumers to 
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122 Jean Ann Fox, Anna Petrini, “Internet Payday Lending: How High-priced Lenders Use the Internet to More 




agree not to participate in class action lawsuits against the lenders, it is difficult for individual 
consumers to challenge the legality of the lenders practices by filing restraining or other orders in 
courts.124 
 
State-by-state attempts at regulating internet payday lending have been less than totally effective 
because of the pervasive nature of the internet. States’ refusals to enforce payday lenders debt 
collection attempts can go part-way to ending payday lending over the internet, but federal laws 
regulating payday lending over the internet would be more effective. There is some strong recent 
precedent for federal regulation of certain types of payday lending. In 2006, the federal 
government banned payday loans with APRs exceeding 36 percent to active-duty military 
families (the regulation emerged from a finding by the Department of Defense that payday 
lending was hurting military readiness).125 
 
 
VII. The Continued Need for Small Loans: Banks and Credit Unions 
  
Banks and credit unions do provide an avenue for consumers to absorb financial shortfalls. A 
North Carolina survey found that over a three year period, 28 percent of respondents took out a 
bank loan during a recent financial shortfall and 23 percent took out overdraft protection loans, 
compared to 11 percent using a pawnshop and 8 percent using a payday lender. More than half of 
those surveyed, however, did not pay bills on time or at all.126 For low income borrowers, there 
is an absence of small loan products to help with such shortfalls. Banks and credit unions have 
not often met this demand because their business models make it difficult to make such loans.  
 
Banks do not typically make small personal loans to low income persons because they face 
stockholder pressure to increase their earnings. The drive to maximize profits impedes banks 
from developing customizable lower cost products and making localized risk assessments for 
low income persons. Technological advances in credit scoring also impede banks from making 
localized decisions about lending to low income persons, who often do not fit neatly into 
industry risk assessment categories such as home ownership, credit history, collateral, capital, 
etc.127 The lack of institutional knowledge about underserved communities and the rise of 
automation and standardization of finance further institutionalizes bias against the historically 
underserved.128   
 
Banks have also begun to rely on fee-based banking revenue whereby banks gain more revenue 
through fees and service charges, such as overdraft protection, than revenue collected from 
interest payments. Such fees fall outside of usury laws and truth in lending regulations. Fee-
based banking has also turned customers with poor credit ratings from a liability into a 
commodity, with such products having some of the negative caveats of payday loans.129 Banking 
                                                 
124 CFA 2004 at 25. 
125 Public Law 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Section 670, 
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institutions also do not nor clearly explain rates and fees. In some cases low income persons have 
a general mistrust of banks.130 The mistrust of banks is particularly common with communities 
of color that have faced discrimination in lending.131 
 
There are some examples of public-private banking initiatives, however, for making small loans 
to low income persons. In Chicago, ShoreBank provides banking services to low income families 
using bank debit accounts, originally based on public assistance deposits. Currently about half of 
customers also use the account for purposes other than public assistance, which can act as small 
loan provider. Governments have also created incentives for lenders to lend to low income 
people. For instance, the City of San Francisco provides free marketing to banks and credit 
unions that provide products and services to low income persons.132 
 
Credit unions also have not often met the needs of low income borrowers, even though their 
original stated purpose was to serve persons with modest means. In 2006 only about 1,000 of the 
9,000 credit unions in the U.S. had small loan products, alternatives to payday loans.133 Some 
credit unions incorporate higher cost fee-based products like many banks do, while others have 
begun to more directly compete with payday lenders, providing low cost-products. 
 
A major push to provide low cost small loan alternatives to payday loans was made by the North 
Carolina State Employees Credit Union (SECU). The credit union introduced the salary advance 
product, a short term loan with a 12 percent APR. To help its members absorb future financial 
shocks it puts five percent of salary advance loan proceeds into customers' savings accounts.  
SECU's salary advance has been highly successful making over 1,000,000 loans for a total of 
$397,497,122, with a modest 90-day delinquency rate of 0.65%.134 
 
A joint partnership between Pennsylvania's Credit Union Association and the Pennsylvania State 
Department of Banking offers a similar savings component (18 percent APR) to small loans 
made through the credit union.135 Other credit unions have subsequently set up lower cost small 
loan products, including in Ohio and Virginia.136 Another credit union in Wisconsin makes use 
of a new small loan software program to expedite processing loans.137 
 
While some credit unions have managed to serve low income communities with relatively low 
default rates they often struggle to gain a foothold in the market. In the 1990s, about half of 
credit unions serving low income communities failed and closed. Credit unions fail because they 
lack capital, liquidity and staffing, and consequentially only offer a limited range of services to 
customers. High default rates are not a leading reason why credit unions serving low income 
borrowers fail. One potential remedy for the shortage of capital and liquidity is for credit unions 
to partner with other conventional lenders, which could provide the credit union with capital to 
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make small loans, foster cross-referrals between the establishments and could help conventional 
lenders fulfill their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) obligations.138 
 
Financial institutions under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are called to 
promote debt products that have affordable rates under the FDIC's Affordable Small-Dollar Loan 
Products Guidelines. The guidelines recommend underwriting that considers the ability to repay, 
working with other organizations, incorporating a savings component to small loans and 
providing assistance for the financial education of borrowers. Participation in such practices can 
qualify institutions for CRA credits.139 
 
 
VIII. Beyond Banks: Fixing the Safety Net  
 
Do you have medical bills to pay, bills that were the result of an illness or injury that was 
completely unforeseen? A cash advance or a payday loan could be just what you need to help 
pay that hefty deductible. Medical bills are becoming more and more of an issue for working 
people as more and more procedures are not covered by a healthcare plan. At Speedy Cash we 
hope to help keep you covered by providing payday loans to get you through the healthcare 
crisis. Payday loans are a perfect fit for this situation as bank are very unlikely to help in this 
predicament, they only want to loan larger amounts of money, not smaller loans that are best 
handled by payday loans.140 
 
The income gap between the rich and the poor in the United States has been growing since the 
1970s. While the income of the richest 25 percent of Americans has steadily increased, incomes 
for the bottom 25 percent have held steady.141 The wealth gap, the gap in net household assets 
minus debts, is even larger. By 2004, the bottom quintile of American households had no net 
wealth.142 Survey research conducted by the Kaiser Commission found that many low and 
middle income families had trouble affording basic necessities, such as food, transportation, 
child care, and housing.143 The cost of household expenses combined with increasing income 
instability makes it difficult, if not impossible for households to generate enough savings to 
create a safety net.144  
 
There is obviously a need for small consumer loans and short-term loans need to be somewhat 
costly in order for them to be economically feasible for business. The very fact, however, that 
large numbers of families turn to payday loans to pay basic expenses means that many families 
are living at the very edge of their budgets and unexpected expenses are sending families into 
long-term debt. For example, in 2004, the Oregon Division of Finance and Corporate Security 
found that Oregonians were regularly using payday loans to purchase groceries.145 While this 
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disclosure shocked many Oregonians, in truth many American families' paychecks do not cover 
household expenses, much less economic shocks like large medical bills or loss of employment. 
Simply making the debt less expensive will not stabilize these families. 
 
High—or moderate—cost loans cannot resolve the problem of increasing economic security for 
lower and even middle income Americans.146 Payday and other predatory lending and the 
attendant consequences for families and communities will remain until real fixes to the social 
safety-net are implemented. While many failures of the social safety net cause stress to low and 
moderate income families, the cost of health care emergencies appears to have a disproportionate 
and severe effect of families’ financial stability.  
 
The average payday borrower is low income, earning less than 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level for a family of four ($42,800 in 2008). Borrowers also tend to be young, unmarried women 
who have a have a high school, but not a college degree.147 This is constant with the profile of 
the payday borrower who earns enough to warrant checking account—meaning that they are not 
the poorest of the poor, they are the working poor. These are the people who make too much 
money to qualify for Medicaid and who work in jobs that are relatively unlikely to come with 
good health insurance.148 
                                                 
146Historically, states have developed usury laws during times when the income inequality is high. Glaeser (1994). 
147 Logan and Weller (2009) (4) Data from the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finances. 
148 Federal Medicaid is generally available for families earning less than 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). In 
2007, the federal poverty line for a family of four was $20,650. Data available at 
www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/medicaid.html. 
State SCHIP programs offer expanded coverage, but even very generous programs limit eligibility to 250% of FPL 
for adults without children. Thirty-two thousand dollars is about 250% of the FPL for a family of two. Most 
uninsured single adults are ineligible for public coverage and have family incomes below 300% of poverty similarly; 
most uninsured parents have incomes below 300% of poverty. Dubay et al. (2006). 
  63
 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 
Minnesota, 9.5 percent of the population is 
uninsured, while in Washington 14.3 percent 
and in Oregon 18.7 percent are uninsured. 
(Table 8) People with low to moderate 
incomes have even higher uninsured rates. 
For those with incomes less than 250 
percent of the poverty line, 19.6 percent in 
Minnesota, 26.2 percent in Washington and 
31.8 percent in Oregon are uninsured. There 
are also racial disparities, especially for 
Hispanics who are more than twice as likely 
to be uninsured than whites in all three 
states. In all three states, Blacks and Asians 
also lag behind whites in health insurance 
coverage. Being underinsured or uninsured 
is, of course, predictive of having difficulty 
paying medical bills and of acquiring 
medical debt.  
 
Medical bills and medical debt are “tied to a 
market for a service that is often life-saving 
and for which the customer is, by definition, 
vulnerable.”149 The pressure to pay off 
medical bill is intense; consumers often believe that failure to pay medical bills will limit their 
access to future medical care.150 In one national survey, one quarter of respondents had been 
unable to pay for food, heat, or rent because of medical debt.151 The extreme financial pressures 
put on individuals as a result of medical debt, could lead people to take out exploitative or 
predatory loans, leading to a spiral of bad debt.152 
 
Medical debt, and correspondingly, un-insurance and underinsurance are a driving part of 
American’s need for small consumer loans and people’s willingness to take-out extremely high-
cost loans. The cost of health care and medical debt is a driving force in mortgage foreclosures, 
bankruptcy, and probably acquiring payday debt. While banning payday loans might turn the 
uninsured and underinsured to more affordable types of credit, medical debt for the working poor 
will continue to be a driving force in the acquisition of debt and a force that drives families to 
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IX.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Payday lending – entails a high costs for families and metropolitan regions. While there is a 
definite need for short term credit, payday lending practices have been shown to drive families 
deeply in debt. Payday lending is associated with a host of negative consequences, including 
delayed medical care,153 increased evictions,154 credit card delinquencies,155 involuntary bank 
account closures,156 and bankruptcy.157  
 
The racial composition of neighborhoods is related to access to good, affordable credit. In the 
metropolitan areas of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland and Seattle, families living in segregated, 
communities of color are disproportionately unlikely to apply for prime loans, to live near a 
traditional bank, and disproportionately more likely to live near a non-conventional or payday 
lender. In low-income communities of color, high cost loans— both in the home mortgage 
market and small consumer loan market—are much more common than they are in white and 
middle-class communities. Poor people of color pay more for loans—an extra cost that many 
families can ill-afford. 
 
Racially segregated communities of color tend to have fewer banks, more check cashers and 
payday lenders, especially in Minneapolis-St. Paul where non-white segregated census tracts are 
more numerous and concentrated in the lower-income core of the region. There are major 
differences across the three regions in the neighborhood shares of lenders by income and race. 
Lower income neighborhoods in Portland and Seattle showed much greater access to 
conventional lenders than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. However, non-conventional lenders tend to be 
disproportionately in lower income neighborhoods in all three metros. 
 
While the bans on roll-over and “cooling off” periods between payday loans tend to be easier to 
pass in state legislatures—these bills tend to be supported by the payday loan industry—rate caps 
are the most effective means of reducing the cost of payday lending. 
 
For low-income borrowers, there is an absence of small loan products to help with such 
shortfalls. Banks and credit unions do provide an avenue for consumers to absorb financial 
shortfalls. Banks and credit unions, however, have not often met this demand because their 
business models make it difficult to make such loans. High—or moderate—cost loans, however, 
cannot resolve the problem of increasing economic security for lower and even middle income 
Americans.158 Payday and other predatory lending and the attendant consequences for families 
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• Effectively Regulate Payday Lending 
 
• Rate caps are, by far, the most effective way to reign in the cost of payday lending: 
research by the Center for Responsible Lending has concluded that interest rate and fee 
caps are the most effective way to limit the cost of payday loans.  
• Federal regulation is necessary to regulate internet payday lending. States cannot 
effectively limit payday lending over the internet; therefore, federal action is necessary.  
• Minnesota needs to close its industrial thrift loophole: Minnesota’s industrial thrift statute 
allows payday lenders to charge far in excess of the APRs contemplated by the 
Minnesota Legislature when it legalized payday lending. The Minnesota Legislature 
should act quickly to end the circumvention of its consumer regulation.   
 
• Encourage Programs that Provide Access to Affordable Credit 
 
• Expand the CRA pilot program: The CRA small dollar loan pilot program is an excellent 
start in encouraging traditional lenders to make affordable, small loans to the working 
poor. This program should be expanded.  
• Establishments such as North Carolina State Employees Credit Union have shown that 
lower cost small loan products can be profitable. Credit unions provide small loans when 
supported by state agencies and other lenders. State and federal programs that aid the 
short-term needs of low income borrowers could increase this capability. 
• Credit unions that lack resources to provide small loan products can partner with other 
lenders through the CRA small dollar loan program. 
 
• Fix the Safety Net 
  
• Support policies designed to lower the income gap between the richest Americans and the 
poorest Americans. 
• Support policies that ensure access to necessities for all Americans, including 
transportation, health care, and childcare.  
• Support for universal health care coverage with low individual premiums would curb 
some of the most severe burdens on the budgets of working families. 
• Federal and state poverty relief programs should cover the working poor—those making 
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